Party leaders fall from grace at Fourth Plenum

BEIJING: Chairman Xi Jinping has really thinned out the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party’s upper echelons. This was painfully obvious when the party convened the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee in Beijing – otherwise known as the Fourth Plenum – on October 20.

Three important takeaways resulted from the exclusive four-day event, which serves as a conclave for party elites to pledge allegiance, for the leadership to make sure they are singing from the same song sheet, and to endorse future plans.

The first noteworthy point was that attendance numbers were even lower than commentators predicted. Just 168 of 205 members (82%) of the Central Committee were present at the Fourth Plenum, as well as 147 out of a possible 171 non-voting alternate members (86%). When added together, some 61 of 376 full or alternate members (16%) were missing in action.

However, nobody could compete with the empty spaces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Less than half of the PLA members were in attendance.

According to the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, the figure of 315 members present is the lowest number since Xi came to power. It compares to 364 at last year’s meeting, 373 the year before, and 371 in 2021. Furthermore, attendance was considerably lower than any preceding Xi-led plenum – 332 members in 2017. It is also a record low for a plenary session since at least the late 1970s.

These figures underscore how ruthless and far-reaching Chairman Xi Jinping’s purges of the upper rungs of the CCP have been. Neil Thomas, a Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, said the closing “communique suggests a huge purge of Central Committee members beyond current rumors.”

Nearly a sixth of the 376 officials who held seats in the Central Committee when its current term commenced three years ago were absent. Most are victims of Xi’s so-called anti-corruption campaign, yet it must be noted that many were also loyalists that Xi himself elevated.

Thomas noted, “Xi is purging senior officials at a faster clip this term because he’s firmly in control of elite politics and free to push his vision of the party as a self-regulating institution that’s capable of disciplining itself without Western-style rule of law.”

The academic added, “Xi appears unconcerned about the reputational cost of removing officials he once promoted. In any case, after more than a decade in charge, nearly every senior cadre has been promoted at some point on his watch.”

Moving to the second key takeaway from this Fourth Plenum, there was a near-record level of disciplinary measures enacted. Ten Central Committee members were publicly named and shamed, as well as four alternate members. Most of these had been clearly announced prior to the plenum. This set a new record for expulsions, even if 2017’s Seventh Plenum had slightly more disciplinary actions taken (eleven members and four alternates). By comparison, last year the Third Plenum saw only three members and one alternate disciplined, so this year certainly marked a major surge.

The only purge not signaled in advance was Major General Zhang Fengzhong, Director of the Political Work Department at the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). Significantly, this alternate member becomes the tenth senior PLA leader under investigation. This means the PLARF has been almost completely purged of former senior leaders, and a new crop of leaders will have to be installed.

Thomas remarked that the purge “suggests the massive corruption/political targeting of the force is ongoing and could hit more targets.”

Those military leaders already set for expulsion, actions endorsed at the plenum, were He Weidong, a Central Military Commission (CMC) vice-chairman; Miao Hua, former head of the Political Work Department; He Hongjun, former deputy head of the same department; Wang Xiubin, former deputy chief of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center; Lin Xiangyang, former head of the PLA Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutong, former Political Commissar of the PLA Ground Force; Yuan Huazhi, former Political Commissar of the PLA Navy; Wang Houbin, former commander of the PLARF; and Wang Chunning, former commander of the People’s Armed Police.

The third and final notable takeaway from the Fourth Plenum also relates to the PLA. General Zhang Shengmin was elevated to become the second-ranked vice chairman of the CMC, the highest body in charge of China’s military and paramilitary forces. Essentially, Zhang, who was formerly a regular member of the CMC, is taking the place of disgraced vice chairman He Weidong. It is informative to note what Zhang’s current position is – Secretary of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection, the agency responsible for managing the recent cleansing of the PLA.

That means the CMC now comprises Xi at the top as chairman, two vice chairmen (Zhang Youxia and the newly elevated Zhang Shengmin), and one other member (Liu Zhenli). The Politburo seat of He Weidong, one of 24, remains empty, so some believe Zhang might be there as a placeholder until a younger vice chairman is appointed at the next party congress in 2027.

With nobody else promoted onto the CMC, Thomas remarked, “[It] looks like Xi will wait until the 21st Party Congress in 2027 to vet new CMC and Politburo members. Seems a smart move given their recent form.”

It is also worth noting which alternates were promoted into full members at the Fourth Plenum. Eleven men were promoted to fill the eleven vacant seats caused by ten expulsions and the death of the head of China’s customs agency last year. Thomas explained the process: “They’re promoted in order from an official list based on the number of votes, but most are unanimous…”

This year witnessed a high number of alternate promotions. Indeed, only four times since 1949 have ten or more alternates been promoted to full membership in the Central Committee. One such plenum occurred during the chaotic time of Mao Zedong’s 1966-76 Cultural Revolution.

The eleven promoted in 2025 included Yu Huiwen, Deputy Minister of Ecology and Environment; Ma Hancheng, Deputy Party Secretary of Guizhou; Wang Jian, Executive Vice Governor of Liaoning; Wang Xi, Director of the Guangdong CCP Organization Department; Wang Yonghong, Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council; Wang Tingkai, Director of the Tianjin CCP Commission for Discipline Inspection; Wang Xinwei, Governor of Liaoning; Wei Tao, Governor of Guangxi; Deng Yiwu, Chairman of China Grain Reserves Corporation; Deng Xiuming, Executive Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court; and Lu Hong, Party Secretary of Wanzhou District, Chongqing.

Another seven alternates were passed over for promotion to the Central Committee: Wang Liyan, Deputy Commander of the PLARF; Wang Kangping, Commander of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force; Wang Jiayi, Deputy Minister of Education; Fang Yongxiang, Director of the CMC General Office; Shi Yugang, Deputy Party Secretary of the Yunnan People’s Political Consultative Conference; and Shi Zhenglu, Ground Force Commander of the PLA Northern Theater Command.

Thomas pointed out that being passed over “can mean political trouble, but not necessarily. Civilians may be safe, but the PLA/CMC military staff are probably under investigation.” Thomas said the passing over of Fang Yongxiang adds credence to rumors that this top military aide of Xi is now out.
The CCP disciplined 889,000 people last year. This number was up 46% from two years ago, and it is the highest number of actions taken since the CCP started releasing such figures about 20 years ago.

During the Fourth Plenum, the Political Bureau gave itself a pat on the back for “securing notable progress” in earnestly implementing guiding principles from preceding plenary sessions. Indeed, China is “now on the verge of accomplishing the major objectives and tasks of the 14th Five-Year Plan.” It also mentioned that the September 3 military parade in Beijing “greatly lifted the national spirit, inspired a strong sense of patriotism among our people, and further pooled strength for our country’s collective endeavors.”

Unsurprisingly, the official communique praised Xi, at the core of the Central Committee, who “has united the entire party and Chinese people of all ethnic groups and led them in meeting difficulties head-on and forging ahead with determination.”

By 2035, China wants its per capita GDP to be on par with that of a mid-level developed country.

An important outcome of the conclave was the adoption of the 15th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development. This plan is critical as China “pushes ahead on all fronts toward basically achieving socialist modernization by 2035.” However, it also warned: “Strategic opportunities exist alongside risks and challenges, while uncertainties and unforeseen factors are rising” in the coming years.

The upcoming plan had a number of aims, such as high-quality development; scientific and technological self-reliance and strength; further deepening of comprehensive reforms; cultural and ethical progress across society; improvements in quality of life; major strides in advancing the Beautiful China Initiative; and strengthening the national security shield.

The communique further stated, “At the session, a call was issued to the whole party, the entire military and Chinese people of all ethnic groups to rally more closely around the party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, work hard together toward the goal of basically realizing socialist modernization, and continue to break new ground in building a great country and advancing national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization.”

As well as economic goals, the communique stated, “We should establish a sound national security system, build up national security capacity in key sectors, enhance public safety governance and improve the social governance system.” Political control over the military is paramount too. “We must ensure that the party exercises absolute leadership over the people’s armed forces, and the system of ultimate responsibility resting with the chairman of the Central Military Commission must be implemented.”

The communique noted: “On this basis, we should continue to enhance political loyalty in the military, strengthen the military through reform, scientific and technological advances and personnel training, and run the military in accordance with the law. We should simultaneously carry out operations, boost combat preparedness and enhance military capabilities, and accelerate integrated military development through mechanization, informatization and the application of smart technologies. All this will enhance our military’s strategic capacity to defend our national sovereignty, security and development interests.”

Interestingly, the word “fight” appeared regularly in the 5,000-word communique. A favored phrase of Xi’s – “Dare to fight, and be good at fighting,” – was used directly too. All the evidence suggests that China and the PLA are preparing to fight, particularly to gain control over Taiwan.

When an Australian journalist asked President Donald Trump, at a recent meeting with Australian Prime Minister Antony Albanese, whether China would invade Taiwan, Trump sunnily responded, “China doesn’t want to do that. I don’t see that at all with President Xi. I think we’re going to get along very well as it pertains to Taiwan and others.”

Yet some are alarmed by Trump’s optimism and naivety, and by his unshakable faith in the US military. “We have the best of everything, and nobody’s going to mess with that,” Trump said.

It is also pertinent to point out that Trump’s benign view is at odds with his officials. For example, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said in May, “It should be clear to all that Beijing is concretely and credibly preparing to use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.” (ANI)